Following the re-election of former US President Donald Trump, ceasefire negotiations between Lebanon and Israel appear to have gained momentum. On Monday, US special envoy Amos Hochstein and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer met in Washington to discuss the issue.

In October Hochstein went to Beirut, but his visit did not yield any results; He made clear that for the United States “it is not enough for both sides to abide by (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 1701” and that a new agreement must be made. “The formula that will put an end to this conflict once and for all.” Setting aside UN resolutions appears to have become commonplace among US officials lately, with disastrous consequences.

In their latest proposal, Israel and the United States demand that Lebanon accept a new arrangement under which Israeli troops can “actively implement” demilitarization in southern Lebanon. In other words, Israel would have effective military control over Lebanese territory.

No sovereign nation or non-state actor would ever agree to these terms. Neither Lebanon nor Hezbollah will give up their military deterrence. Therefore, the US and Israel’s insistence on these new conditions will only prolong the war.

Building a new consensus around Resolution 1701 remains the only viable path to peace.

The decision ended Israel’s last war with Lebanon in 2006; It served as a mechanism to cease hostilities and outlined measures to clear the border area of ​​the presence of armed groups. It effectively brought an end to the conflict, although there were problems in its full implementation, with both sides aware that this would happen.

Adherence to its implementation could stop hostilities this time too. And Hezbollah must make the first move.

The terrible prospect of a long war

On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that Hezbollah had been defeated after 40 days of intense fighting. “It is now our duty to continue pressing to reap the fruits of this victory,” he said during an official ceremony.

Israel appears to believe that it can persuade Hezbollah to surrender by force. However, pursuing a military solution in Lebanon would mean a war that would be nothing like the conflict in 2006.

At the time, Israel’s ground offensive faltered and public support waned as casualties mounted. Today, Prime Minister Netanyahu has the support of the Israeli public, supported by military successes that have eliminated Hezbollah’s leadership and disrupted its communications networks.

Despite these losses, Hezbollah is better prepared, better equipped and arguably more disciplined than in 2006. It is not surprising that Israel has been unable to gain more than a few miles of ground since ground attacks began and daily rocket salvoes were directed. continues in northern and central Israel.

Barring any major change or diplomatic shift to put pressure on Israel under the incoming Trump administration, all of this means we are in for a very long war.

An important deterrent

Hezbollah has resumed hostilities with Israel in support of its ally Hamas, and until recently had a ceasefire with Israel conditional on a ceasefire in Gaza. The group understands that many Lebanese understand the ongoing intervention, but many others are unhappy with its actions over at least the last two decades.

Hezbollah has made many enemies at home and abroad by supporting the Syrian regime in the 2010s, helping to maintain the rule of corrupt Lebanese elites when the economy collapsed in 2019, and obstructing the investigation into the 2020 Beirut port explosion, relying almost entirely on Iran for diplomatic influence and military power. .

Its refusal to integrate its weapons into the national defense strategy by keeping its weapons outside the command and control of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has also led to massive mismanagement of national security and left the country vulnerable to Israel’s vastly superior military.

The destruction caused by Israel in Lebanon is also a major source of concern. The longer the massive migrations from the south and east of the country continue, the more social tensions and anger towards Hezbollah will increase.

At the same time, Hezbollah’s arsenal of deterrent missiles and fighters is Lebanon’s only real bargaining chip. Without Hezbollah, Israel’s Merkava tanks would almost certainly have entered Beirut and installed a puppet regime, meeting little resistance along the way.

The Lebanese who call on Hezbollah to lay down arms for peace are either living in a fantasy world or are simply terrible negotiators.

However, if Hezbollah wants to salvage some semblance of Lebanon’s unity, the onus is on it to come to the table with a political plan for implementing Resolution 1701. It also needs to prove that it can work within a national framework and not just within a national framework. He acts as Iran’s proxy.

Given the distrust among those opposed, these initiatives need to happen in phases to work. For starters, Hezbollah needs to explain how it will formally coordinate with the LAF to create a joint deterrent force, just as it did when they fought together against ISIS in 2017. In addition, Hezbollah must accept that the national army and government speak on its behalf, and take its place in such a structure without the threat of weapons or veto power over political decisions.

From here, the party will need to elaborate on Lebanon’s national defense strategy, which cannot rely solely on the woefully under-resourced LAF. Hezbollah’s arms are needed for this strategy, but a clear road map for integration is also needed.

New deterrence framework

Any new defense strategy that would deprive Lebanon of deterrence against Israel’s war machine would surely fail and strengthen Iran and Hezbollah’s case for maintaining non-state deterrence. Talks about a new national security framework and support for the LAF at conferences such as the one held by France at the end of October are irrelevant because concrete security guarantees for Lebanon are not provided.

If French President Emmanuel Macron or any Western leader were serious about supporting Lebanon, they would offer something more concrete than imposing an arms embargo on Israel. France could, for example, offer Rafale jets or air defense systems that would allow the LAF to create its own deterrent.

Of course, this would mean France surpassing the US in material support for the LAF; This is something that was unlikely, at least before Hezbollah and Iran established a well-defined stance on Lebanon’s national defense.

What is clear at this stage is that an international diplomatic solution is needed, but one that does not ignore the consensus reached in 2006. The West and the incoming Trump administration must face the fact that security guarantees and a new agreement cannot be achieved without a return to Resolution 1701. Military deterrence for Lebanon and wars with Israel will continue.

Hezbollah and Iran also need to understand that they cannot run a private army in Lebanon and get away with it without causing deadly consequences. Otherwise, everyone will find themselves talking about another “new formula” on the battlefield again.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.