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Israel may emerge advantageous from the Gaza war, but will it? – First post
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Israel may emerge advantageous from the Gaza war, but will it? – First post

The war in Gaza is slowly entering a phase that could either drag on for months without a decisive victory, or escalate into a broader, dangerous conflict engulfing the region. There is a third option: Israel accepts the ceasefire plan approved by the UN Security Council, calling for resignation. The question is whether Israel sees the current status quo as good enough to decide to resign.

Over the past few months, Israel has gained the upper hand in most aspects of the battlefield. Successful assassinations of senior Hamas and Hezbollah leaders should be at the top of the success chart. It all started on July 30, when three important leaders were killed on the same night. Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh was killed in an attack on a heavily guarded area in Tehran. While Hezbollah’s top military commander and number 2 in the hierarchy, Faud Shukra, was killed in an air strike in Beirut, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Forces Commander, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizade, was killed in Damascus.

It was a major defeat for the ‘Axis of Resistance’, with the pager attacks on 17 September followed by the successive elimination of Hezbollah’s top leaders and the killing of its charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September. And the October 16 assassination of Hamas Chief and chief architect of the October 7 terrorist attack, Yahya Sinwar, ended this streak of success and acts of redemption by Israeli intelligence services.

Iran’s October 1 attack targeting key military sites in Israel was a failure, but Israel’s October 26 retaliation, which successfully targeted three military sites in Iran, evened the scores. On the battlefield, Israeli defense forces also brutally strike the Gaza Strip, especially its northern parts, killing and displacing hundreds of people every day. While the operations carried out in the West Bank with the entry of tanks and troops within the scope of the land operation on August 27 neutralized the resistance there, the focus of the operations is the Jenin camp and Nablus regions.

On the Lebanese front, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered southern Lebanon on 30 September. Despite facing stiff resistance, the IDF managed to destroy many rocket launch sites, weapons depots, and even a network of underground tunnels. However, despite Israel suffering many tank losses and many soldiers dying, harsh clashes on the ground continue.

As the operations drag on, there is a possibility that Iran will launch a ‘counter retaliation’ against Israel’s October 26 attacks. The US elections to be held on November 5 will also mean opening a window of opportunity for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to act with impunity. , can also be closed. Media reports indicate that Donald Trump told Prime Minister Netanyahu to clean up the mess and end the war before his presidency begins (in case he wins the election). In such a scenario, Israel would do well to reconsider its war objectives and see whether it has the option of exiting the war wisely while the opportunity still exists.

Review of Israel’s War Goals

When Israel launched an attack against Gaza on October 7, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “We will strongly avenge this bad day. Hamas launched a brutal and treacherous war. “We will win this war, but the cost is unbearably heavy,” he said. Israel identified three war objectives; To completely eliminate Hamas’ military capabilities, ensure that Gaza does not pose any military threat to Israel in the future, and return all hostages safely. Following a security cabinet meeting on September 16 this year, Israel added the “safe return” of northern settlers to their homes as a fourth goal.

A quick review of war objectives shows us that Israel is still far from achieving its stated goals. Although Hamas has been largely discredited and its top leaders eliminated, it is far from being ‘wiped off the face of the earth’. The ability to launch sustained attacks across Gaza continues to vex Israel, and the unprecedented destruction caused by Israeli attacks motivates more and more cadres to join Hamas. Gaza was bombed like no other place before. More than 42,500 people, mostly children and women, were killed and more than 2 million people were internally displaced multiple times. Despite the destruction and ruins, the rebuilding and reuse of Gaza by Hamas or another group to launch attacks on Israel in the future cannot be ruled out, unless Israel decides to continue its occupation of Gaza indefinitely.

Failure to achieve the third war goal, the return of hostages, is the most critical goal for Israel. There is increasing pressure on Netanyahu for his failure to take back the hostages. Meanwhile, the number of surviving hostages decreases with each passing week due to Israeli action, deaths from crossfire, health problems or succumbing to disease. Hamas has made it clear that the remaining hostages can only be released if a sustainable ceasefire is achieved.

The fourth war objective, ‘the safe return of the setters to the North’, is also still elusive. No matter how far Israel advances deeper into Lebanon, Hezbollah’s ability to launch rocket attacks into Northern Israel cannot be ignored, despite heavy losses. Even if Israel is finally able to occupy the area up to the Litani River, rocket attacks with long-range rockets may continue in the future. The emergence of armed drones has further complicated the situation.

Where does this leave Israel? Despite many recent tactical successes, combat objectives remain elusive. So what can Israel do under these conditions?

Ceasefire Options

As briefly discussed at the beginning, the war is delicately balanced with three possible options: to continue indefinitely, to escalate further, or to end with a ceasefire while Israel still looks like the winner.

As for the ceasefire, there have been many efforts towards it. Apart from a brief humanitarian ceasefire in November last year, no ceasefire proposal has been accepted by either warring side. The most valid proposal, called the Biden Plan, was put forward on May 31 this year. The plan proposed a three-phase ceasefire that, according to Biden, would “bring all hostages home, ensure Israel’s security, create a better day in Gaza without Hamas in power, and lay the groundwork for a political solution that will ensure peace.” A better future for both Israelis and Palestinians.”

Israel initially confirmed that Biden’s proposal had been accepted by it, but the very next day issued a statement saying that Israel would not accept a ceasefire unless Hamas’s military and administrative capabilities were completely destroyed, all hostages were released, and Gaza was no longer closed. It poses a threat to Israel. On June 10, even the UN Security Council approved the US-backed Gaza ceasefire resolution. However, the proposal could not be implemented after Israel backed down.

Later in August, under the influence of the joint statement made by the leaders of the USA, Qatar and Egypt on August 9, a new ‘bridging proposal’ was presented to Israel and Hamas. Hamas rejected the proposed ‘bridge proposal’ on the grounds that it added new and unacceptable conditions. Their main sticking point was Israel’s demand that the IDF remain stationed in the Philadelphi Corridor, which runs along the Gaza-Egypt border, to prevent Hamas from smuggling weapons into Gaza. Israel was not ready to withdraw from the Netzarim Corridor, which was created by its own forces during the war and separates the north and south of Gaza. The bridging proposal also required Hamas to release the most vulnerable civilian hostages; The parties, on the other hand, would negotiate the implementation of the second and third phases without giving Hamas any “guarantees” from Israel or mediators.

According to media reports, most recently on October 21, the director of Egypt’s General Intelligence Agency presented the idea of ​​a “small” hostage and ceasefire agreement in Gaza to Israel’s Shin Bet chief. The deal will include the release of a small number of hostages held by Hamas in exchange for a few days of ceasefire in Gaza. The “little deal” would then be followed by renewed negotiations on a more comprehensive hostage and ceasefire agreement.

Latest Developments

On 30 October, Hezbollah’s new chief, Naim Kasim, stated that the group would be open to a ceasefire offer “according to the conditions we deem appropriate”, adding that the group would not beg for a ceasefire. While the Supreme Leader sought to downplay the impact of the Israeli attack, stating that Israeli attacks ‘should neither be underestimated nor exaggerated’, there are indications that Iran is not keen on retaliating against Israel’s attack on 26 October any time soon.

Another important factor is the support of Israel’s biggest patron, the USA. With only a few days left until the presidential elections, it is clear that the window through which Israel can put pressure on the United States and act with impunity in Gaza is rapidly closing. Even US Secretary of State Blinken, during his 11th visit to the region on October 23, said that Israel should pursue “lasting strategic success” in Gaza by using the tactical victories it has recently won against Hamas and Hezbollah.

Solution

The ball is clearly in Israel’s court. He can either pursue unrealistic and perhaps unattainable war objectives forever, or he can think wisely and use the opportunity presented to him on the battlefield to end this war and take back his hostages. Of all wartime objectives, it is undoubtedly the most important and certainly the most achievable. This could also stop Iran’s plan for a strong counter-retaliation; indications are that he is not keen on this as it would lead to unnecessary tension.

Although everything presented and discussed seems logical, it may not be to the liking of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his war cabinet, who are seizing this opportunity to take this war as far as possible in order to end the menace. To bury forever the story of the ‘two-state solution’, which was also decided in the Israeli parliament on July 18, 2024. With the window of opportunity rapidly closing, the question on everyone’s mind is: Will Israel use it? Will you take this opportunity and cancel the fight while you still have all the cards?