KAMALA HARRIS’ ENTIRE CAMPAIGN relied on increasing turnout in major cities in swing states: Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Milwaukee and Atlanta, plus Charlotte, Phoenix and Las Vegas in an optimistic scenario. Harris’ feasible goal in her campaign plan was to get more votes in major cities in 2024 than Biden did in 2020.

The essence of the strategy was not to change voters’ minds or win the support of volatile constituencies; but some of this was also present, especially in the suburbs. Rather, it was to generate huge raw vote totals in large urban areas that traditionally favored the Democrats.

This strategy has worked in the past: One reason Joe Biden won the presidency in 2020 was because he garnered huge votes. big cities. Even in a place like Philadelphia — a state that Trump will contest more closely in 2020 than in 2016 — the size of the Democratic vote helped swing the state from red to blue.

This year in Harris, Philadelphia County acquired 567 thousand votes for Trump 144,000. However, Biden defeated Trump in the same district in 2020. 604,000 to 133,000. Biden received nearly 37,000 more votes in Philadelphia in 2020 than Harris received in 2024.

Considering the broader Philadelphia metro area (Philadelphia, Allegheny, Montgomery, Bucks and Delaware counties), Biden received nearly 69,000 more votes than Harris. Biden’s margin in the state was about 82,000 votes, so the extra 69,000 votes in Philadelphia goes a long way toward explaining why he won and Harris lost.

The same goes for Michigan. In Wayne County (home to Detroit), Harris received nearly 60,000 fewer votes than Biden did in 2020. Adding in the other most populous counties in Michigan (Oakland, Macomb, Kent and Genesee), the result was 85,000 fewer votes than for Harris. Four years ago for Biden.

Although the vote totals in these cities were not the sole determinant of Harris’s defeat to Trump, they are among the underappreciated reasons for the result. This year, Trump won Pennsylvania by about 132,000 votes and Michigan by about 80,000 votes; So even if Harris did as well as Biden in the major districts in these states, it still wouldn’t be enough.

Likewise, in Wisconsin, where Trump won by about 30,000 votes this time, Harris received about 12,000 more votes than Biden in Madison and Milwaukee.

And it wasn’t just in the swing states of the Midwest, either. In North Carolina, Harris ran equally with Biden in urban centers, not better; in fact, the difference in raw vote totals in Mecklenburg, Wake and Durham counties was just 640 votes. In counties that include Atlanta, Fulton and DeKalb, Harris received about 4,500 fewer votes overall than Biden. His campaign relied on heavy turnout in cities, and at best he ran roughly evenly with Biden.

The expectation of higher turnout in these two Southern states had a demographic basis: North Carolina’s population has increased by about 400,000 since 2020, while Georgia has increased by about 250,000; they also both rank among the states with the highest African American populations (Georgia, NC, at 32 percent). with 22 percent).

For Harris, the issue wasn’t just vote share (a higher percentage of voters in urban areas chose Trump) but overall turnout. Nearly 21,000 fewer people voted in Philadelphia County this year more 2020. So was Wayne County. 15,000 Less.

Since the shock of Trump’s victory in 2016, Democrats have struggled with how to appeal to blue-collar suburban and rural voters. Part of the party’s response was to nominate candidates like Joe Biden of Scranton and John Fetterman (the former mayor of a former steel mill town in the Pittsburgh area), as well as to invest heavily in rural broadband, infrastructure, manufacturing and a range of pro-union activities. policies. But all these investments may have boomeranged: Washington Post columnist Heather Long pointing Urban counties with the highest costs of living leaned most toward Trump. Biden and the Democrats aren’t solely responsible for cities being expensive, but worsening underlying inflation due to massive government spending during and after COVID hasn’t helped.

After the shock of Trump’s re-election in 2024, Democrats now also have to grapple with how to win back cities with margins that allow them to carry swing states. In the past, Democrats have relied on coalitions of minority groups (especially black voters) to advance their urban victories. No more: Long too highlights The least white urban areas were found to shift the most to Trump. As minorities drift toward the GOP, Democrats will have to rethink how they can appeal to urban voters as urbanites rather than as members of identity groups based on race or culture.

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